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Case No. 20170518-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.

TRACY SCOTT,

Defendant/Respondent.

Reply Brief of Petitioner
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State
submits this brief in reply to new matters raised in Defendant’s responsive
brief. The State does not concede any matters not addressed in the reply, but
believes those matters are adequately addressed in the State’s opening brief.

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT, LIKE THE COURT OF APPEALS,
INCORRECTLY APPLIES STRICKLAND’S PERFORMANCE
STANDARD BY ASSUMING THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL
HAD A SUBJECTIVE STRATEGY IN MIND RATHER THAN
EVALUATING
WHETHER
DEFENSE
COUNSEL’S
ACTIONS WERE OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE
Defendant murdered his wife by shooting her three times at point
blank range. He admitted killing his wife, but relied on an extreme emotional

distress defense. Among other things, he testified that three days before he
killed his wife, she had threatened him, and that when he saw her by their
gun safe and noticed that a Beretta was missing, he took the threat seriously
and believed that she meant to harm him. When Defendant began to testify
about his wife’s alleged threat, however, the State objected that the testimony
was inadmissible hearsay.
Defense counsel did not counter that the exact words were admissible
non-hearsay because they were not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. The trial court sustained the State’s objection, so the jury never
heard the alleged threat’s exact words.
On appeal, Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for not
making the non-hearsay argument. The court of appeals agreed, reasoning
that defense counsel was deficient because admitting the specific words of
the threat—which are not part of the record—would only have strengthened
his defense. The court of appeals began and ended its analysis with whether
defense counsel’s strategy was sound.
But as the State showed in its opening brief, whether the representation
advances sound strategy is a consideration, but it is not determinative of
Strickland’s deficient performance element. Rather, the determinative
question “is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they
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were reasonable.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000). Defendant
nevertheless defends the court of appeals’ reasoning. He assumes that
defense counsel’s subjective strategy was to introduce the specific words of
Teresa’s alleged threat: “There can be no doubt,” Defendant contends, that
“defense counsel was attempting to admit the evidence.” Br.Resp.22.1 And
because defense counsel did not “make a basic evidentiary argument” to
overcome the prosecution’s hearsay objection, Defendant concludes, defense
counsel necessarily performed deficiently. Br.Resp.29. In Defendant’s eyes,
counsel is deficient whenever he fails to do what he sets out to do. Id.
The record, however, does not demonstrate either that defense
counsel’s subjective strategy was to introduce the content of Teresa’s alleged
threat or that defense counsel did not respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay
objection due to unreasonable preparation to meet it. And because the record
does not support either contention, Defendant did not rebut Strickland’s
strong presumption that defense counsel performed effectively. The court of
appeals erred by holding otherwise.

1

Defendant asserts that the “state, defense, and Court of Appeals all
agreed that the threat was not hearsay and should have been admitted.”
Br.Resp.10. The State, however, did not agree that the content of Teresa’s
alleged threat “should” have been admitted. Id. Rather, it agreed only that
the content of the alleged threat was not hearsay.
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But even if the record did reflect that defense counsel’s subjective
strategy had initially been to introduce the specific content of Teresa’s alleged
threat yet failed to do so, Defendant still did not prove that his counsel
performed deficiently. The ultimate inquiry under Strickland is not whether
defense counsel had a specific strategy in mind (and failed to accomplish it),
but whether defense counsel’s actions were objectively reasonable. Because
reasonably competent counsel could have proceeded as defense counsel did
here, Defendant did not meet his burden to prove that his counsel was
objectively deficient. The court of appeals erroneously held that he did.
A. Defendant did not rebut Strickland’s strong presumption that
his counsel had a valid strategic reason not to respond to the
prosecutor’s hearsay objection.
It is Defendant’s burden to prove that his counsel performed
deficiently and that he was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687–89, 694 (1984). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance”
is “highly deferential,” and counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered
adequate assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-690.
Strickland’s strong presumption exists because “[t]here are countless
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.” Id. at 689.
“Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one
case may be sound or even brilliant in another.” Id. at 693. Indeed, “[d]ifferent
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lawyers have different gifts,” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313
(11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1204 (2001), and “[e]ven the best criminal
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
In addition, the trial process “contains a myriad of complex decisions”
that often are made in the heat of trial and made with the benefit of
experience, knowledge, and information that is not apparent on the record.
United States v. Forston, 194 F.3d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 1999); Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (explaining that counsel “observed the relevant
proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the
client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge”); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S.
115, 125 (2011) (noting that counsel’s actions can be influenced by “insights
borne of past dealings with the same prosecutor or court”). Reviewing courts
thus must be careful of “the potential for the distortions and imbalance that
can inhere in a hindsight perspective.” Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 125. As a result,
the United States Supreme Court has mandated that “deference must be
accorded to counsel’s judgment.” Id. at 126. Counsel is “strongly presumed
to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in
the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
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It is the defendant’s burden to rebut this presumption. Id.; Burt v.
Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (stating that “burden to ‘show that counsel’s
performance was deficient’ rests squarely on the defendant”) (internal
citation removed). A defendant cannot assume that his counsel acted out of
neglect or incompetence. He must prove it. See State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5,
¶30, 253 P.3d 1082 (“[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). And “[i]t should go without saying that
the absence of evidence cannot overcome the ‘strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.’” Titlow, 134 S. Ct. at 17 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also
Sallahdin v. Mullin, 380 F.3d 1242, 1248-1251 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that
Sallahdin failed to overcome the “strong presumption of constitutionally
reasonable conduct” where there was “‘no discernible explanation for
counsel’s failure to call’” expert witness; counsel’s incompetence could not be
assumed); Fretwell v. Norris, 133 F.3d 621, 623-624 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
counsel’s inability to remember reasons for his performance did not rebut the
presumption that he performed effectively); Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314 n.15
(explaining that an “ambiguous or silent record is not sufficient to disprove
the strong and continuing presumption” that counsel performed effectively).
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Here, the court of appeals did not hold Defendant to this burden.
Defendant assumes both that defense counsel subjectively intended to
introduce the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat and that counsel did
not respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay objection out of neglect or lack of
knowledge. But the record does not support either assumption.
First, the record does not reflect that defense counsel intended to
introduce the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat. For example, defense
counsel never mentioned Teresa’s alleged threat in his opening statement. See
R.277:17-29. If this were “the linchpin of the defense,” as Defendant and the
court of appeals contend, one would expect defense counsel to at least
mention it in his opening statement. Br.Resp.28. He did not.
But even more importantly, defense counsel never asked Defendant to
tell the jury exactly what he claimed Teresa said to him. Instead, defense
counsel asked Defendant only “who threatened who?” and “After you saw
the safe opened, . . . what were you thinking?” R.278:113-114. It was
Defendant’s responses—not defense counsel’s questions—that drew the
prosecutor’s objections. Id. Again, if defense counsel’s strategy had been to
introduce the specific wording of Teresa’s threat, one would expect defense
counsel to specifically ask Defendant what those words were, just as defense
counsel did when he asked witnesses to repeat out-of-court statements in
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other contexts. See R.278:118 (asking Defendant, “what did you tell your
mother?”); R.278:177 (asking Defendant’s mother, “what did [Defendant] tell
you?”).
Second, the record does not reflect that defense counsel did not
respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay objections out of neglect or lack of
knowledge. Indeed, just four pages of transcript after defense counsel did not
respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay objection at issue here, defense counsel
responded to a hearsay objection to different testimony with the very nonhearsay argument that Defendant argues defense counsel should have made
but did not. Br.Resp.19. During this later exchange, defense counsel
responded to the prosecutor’s hearsay objection by arguing that the
testimony was “not being offered for the truth of the matter” and “was also
his present sense impression and his state of mind.” R.278:118-119. This
rebuts Defendant’s surmise that defense counsel “lack[ed]” the “basic
evidentiary knowledge” to get the specific words of Teresa’s threat admitted
as non-hearsay. Br.Resp.19.
Likewise, when defense counsel was questioning the witness following
Defendant and the prosecutor again objected that defense counsel was
eliciting hearsay, defense counsel exhaustively argued that the testimony was
admissible under the rules of evidence. R.278:177-184. Again, if defense
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counsel did not understand hearsay or the rules of evidence as Defendant
asserts, one would not expect defense counsel to have been able to make these
evidentiary arguments.
The record thus does not support Defendant’s assertion that defense
counsel intended to introduce the content of Teresa’s alleged threat but was
unable to do so because he did not understand the rules of evidence. Quite
the opposite. The record supports the conclusion that defense counsel did not
intend to introduce the content of Teresa’s alleged threat. See Yarborough v.
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“When counsel focuses on some issues to the
exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical
reasons rather than through sheer neglect.”); Richter, 562 U.S. at 109 (same).
And even if there were some basis in the record to suggest that defense
counsel initially intended to introduce the specific words of Teresa’s threat, a
competent attorney could have reversed course. Here, defense counsel
elicited Defendant’s unrebutted testimony that (1) Teresa threatened him,
and (2) the threat made him fear for his life. Counsel could have concluded
that this was enough. He may have determined that the specific words of the
threat would have diluted this testimony if the jury could have concluded
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that they were insufficient to make someone actually fear for their life.2 Or
he may have determined that, facing a judge who was hostile to admitting
the evidence, he had the critical information before the jury anyway, and he
would preserve his hearsay battles for evidence that mattered more. Defense
counsel, not the court of appeals, was best positioned to weigh those risks
and benefits. And unless no competent counsel would have struck the
balance as trial counsel did, the presumption of competent representation
remained unrebutted. Defendant did not meet that burden and the court of
appeals did not hold him to it.
By assuming that defense counsel’s unwavering intent was to
introduce this evidence, Defendant and the court of appeals ignored
Strickland’s directive to not “second-guess” defense counsel’s performance on
the basis of an inanimate record. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. And they
contradicted Strickland’s mandate that defense counsel is strongly presumed
to have acted in the exercise of his professional judgment. Id.; Munguia, 2011
UT 5, ¶30 (“[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative
matter but must be a demonstrable reality.”); Sallahdin, 380 F.3d at 1248-1251
(holding that Sallahdin failed to overcome the “strong presumption of

2

Defense counsel presumably knew what those words were, but they
are not part of the record.
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constitutionally reasonable conduct” where there was “‘no discernible
explanation for counsel’s failure to call’” expert witness; counsel’s
incompetence could not be assumed); Fretwell, 133 F.3d at 623-624 (holding
that counsel’s inability to remember reasons for his performance did not
rebut the presumption that he performed effectively); Chandler, 218 F.3d at
1314 n.15 (explaining that an “ambiguous or silent record is not sufficient to
disprove the strong and continuing presumption” that counsel performed
effectively).
The “Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care.”
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. The court of appeals failed to do so here. And in
failing to do so, the court of appeals’ precedent “threaten[s] the integrity of
the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.” Id. (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–690). The Court should reverse.
But even if defense counsel had subjectively intended to introduce the
content of Teresa’s threat and failed to do so, the court of appeals still erred.
To prove deficient performance, Defendant must not only rebut the
presumption that defense counsel acted in the exercise of his professional
judgement, but also prove that counsel’s performance was objectively
unreasonable. The court of appeals erred by not holding Defendant to this
burden.
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B.

The determinative question under Strickland’s performance
standard is whether defense counsel’s actions were objectively
reasonable, not whether counsel had a specific strategy in
mind.
Both Defendant and Amicus Curiae fault the State for “imagin[ing] a

different case where the defense does not intend to admit the threat
evidence.” Br.Resp.13; Amicus Br.17.3 According to them, because the
“defense’s objective” was to introduce the content of Teresa’s alleged threat,
the question “is not . . . why some other attorney might conclude it was
reasonable trial strategy to not admit the evidence.” Br.Resp.13. In their view,
“the correct inquiry—the one conducted by the Court of Appeals—is whether

3

Amicus Curiae further faults the State for relying on United States
Supreme Court precedent that involved federal habeas corpus review. See
Amicus Br.23-24. Although Amicus Curiae seems to agree that Strickland—a
federal habeas corpus case—controls, it asserts that later Supreme Court
cases “have no bearing on the Strickland analysis” because the question in
those cases “was not whether a trial counsel’s performance violated
Strickland, but instead whether the State court’s holding that it did not violate
Strickland was unreasonable.” Amicus Br.23. The State agrees that the
question in current federal habeas cases reviewing state decisions is whether
the state court’s application of the Supreme Court’s Strickland standard was
reasonable. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (“The pivotal question is whether the
state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.”). But
to determine whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard
was reasonable, the Supreme Court must first articulate what that standard
is. Relying on the Supreme Court’s articulation of the Strickland standard in
federal habeas cases, then, is perfectly appropriate. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
697 (“The principles governing ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal
collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in motions for a new
trial.”). Amicus Curaie offers no authority providing otherwise.
-12-

trial counsel’s failure to know and properly argue the hearsay rules regarding
evidence that was critical to the strategy he chose fell below an objective
standard.” Amicus Br.17 (emphasis added). In other words, if counsel picks
a strategy and fails to correctly advance it, counsel is constitutionally
ineffective. This is not the Strickland standard.
As a threshold matter, as shown, the assumption that defense counsel’s
intent here was to introduce the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat is
not supported by the record. But it does not matter. The determinative
question under Strickland is whether counsel’s performance was objectively
reasonable.
To establish deficient performance under Strickland, a defendant must
show that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. Strickland turns on defense counsel’s “acts
or omissions.” A defendant “must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that
are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added). “The court must then determine
whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. (emphasis
added). See also Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315 n.16 (“To uphold a lawyer’s
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strategy, we need not attempt to divine the lawyer’s mental processes
underlying the strategy.”).
This requires a defendant to “persuad[e] the court that there was no
conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions.” State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶6, 89
P.3d 162 (emphasis in original, quotations and citations omitted). The State is
not required to articulate a reasonable explanation for counsel’s acts or
omissions. Nor does a defendant succeed merely because this Court cannot
conceive of a tactical explanation for counsel’s performance. Rather, “‘the
defendant’” always bears the burden to “‘overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound
trial strategy.’” Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ¶19, 165 P.3d 1195 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also Titlow 134 S.Ct. at 17 (explaining that
“burden to ‘show that counsel’s performance was deficient’ rests squarely on
the defendant”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). And when it is possible
to conceive of a reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel’s actions, then a
defendant clearly has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel
performed reasonably. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶7.
The ultimate inquiry under Strickland’s deficient performance standard
thus “is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they were
reasonable.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
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Richter, 562 U.S. at 110 (explaining that Strickland inquires “into the objective
reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of
mind”). This inquiry necessarily requires the reviewing court to “imagine”
whether a reasonable attorney in the same or similar circumstances could
have proceeded the same way as defense counsel. Br.Resp.13. In other words,
the court must “affirmatively entertain the range of possible ‘reasons [a
defendant]’s counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.’” Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011) (internal citation, alteration, and quotation
marks omitted); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“the general presumption
of objective reasonableness requires a petitioner to ‘overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy’”) (citation omitted and emphasis added). If
a hypothetical attorney could have reasonably decided to take the same
course of action as defense counsel, defense counsel’s representation met
constitutional requirements. See Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1320 n.27 (explaining
that counsel does not perform deficiently if fully informed and competent
“hypothetical counsel” could take same action); Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d
1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (explaining that Strickland requires
reviewing court to consider “whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial
could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial”);

-15-

Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(explaining that “[i]f a competent defense attorney in trial counsel’s shoes
reasonably could have” proceeded as defense counsel, he “cannot be
deemed” to have provided “constitutionally deficient performance”);
Sallahdin, 380 F.3d at 1250-1251 (entertaining possible reasons why counsel
would not have called expert witness); United States v. Fortson, 194 F.3d 730,
736 (6th Cir. 1999) (“We can conceive of numerous reasonable strategic
motives for the decision.”); “State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009)
(citation omitted) (“Counsel acts within that objective standard of
reasonableness when the attorney provides the client with the ‘representation
by an attorney exercising customary skills and diligence that a reasonably
competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.’”).4

4

The reasonable care standard in negligence cases is analogous. See
Overby v. Union Laundry Co., 100 A.2d. 205, 208 (N.J. App. 1953) (“In the field
of negligence we compare and contrast the conduct of the accused with that
which the hypothetical person of reasonable vigilance, caution and prudence
would have exercised in the same or similar factual conditions.”); Sutkowski
v. Tymczyna, 2010 WL 4721156 *7U (N.J. App. 2010) (“The defendant’s
conduct is compared with that which a hypothetical person of reasonable
vigilance would do under the same or similar circumstances.”). This standard
is objective because “it charts a course for judging people equally and it is
easier to prove than a state of mind.” 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and
Litigation § 3:19 (2d ed. 2017) Indeed, “[i]f the law is to be objective, the norm
of conduct must be objective.” 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation §
3:19 (2d ed. 2017). Thus, “[c]onsistent with the objectivity of the law, liability
depends on the quality of the act rather than the state of mind of the actor.”
Id.
-16-

This can be true even if defense counsel failed in his chosen strategy.
True, defense counsel’s subjective intent can be relevant. See Chandler, 218
F.3d at 1320 n.27 (“[W]hen we refer to trial counsel’s testimony explaining his
personal mental processes . . . we are not crediting his testimony as absolutely
true; but we point to this lawyer’s testimony as illustrating the kinds of
thoughts some lawyer in the circumstances could—we conclude—reasonably
have had.”). This is so because to show his counsel’s performance “fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, he
must show that “no competent attorney” would have acted similarly. Moore,
562 U.S. at 124; Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th
Cir. 2011) (explaining that counsel is deficient only when “counsel’s error is
so egregious that no reasonably competent attorney would have acted
similarly”). For if a competent attorney reasonably could have followed the
same course of action as defense counsel, it does not matter that defense
counsel actually fell short of his subjectively chosen course of action. See State
v. Sessions, 2014 UT 44, ¶21, 342 P.3d 738 (concluding that trial counsel
performed reasonably despite “his unawareness of the law” because
“operative inquiry is whether the ‘actual representation would still have been
within the range of objectively reasonable representation,’ even if counsel
had been ‘aware of [the law]’”); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1048 (10th
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Cir. 2002) (holding that defense counsel’s performance was not objectively
unreasonable even though he was subjectively unaware of the law because a
hypothetical, “fully informed attorney could have” performed the same
way); Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1470-1471 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(holding that counsel’s ignorance of potential defense was not deficient
performance because fully competent attorney aware of the defense “could
well have taken action identical to counsel in this case”); partial overruling on
other grounds recognized by Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir.
1997); Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009) (citation omitted) (holding that
counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable even though
counsel signed affidavit stating that it had not occurred to him to object to
evidence); Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
even “if many reasonable lawyers would not have done as defense counsel
did at trial, no relief can be granted on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is
shown that no reasonable lawyer, in the circumstances, would have done
so”).
This makes sense. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, if two attorneys
take the identical action, but for different reasons, it would be illogical to label
one as constitutionally acceptable and the other constitutionally deficient:
If some reasonable lawyer might not have pursued a certain
defense or not called a certain witness, we fail to understand
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why we would order a new trial on the ground that the actual
lawyer had not used the defense or witness in the first trial: at
the new trial, a different lawyer (even a reasonable one) might
again not use the witness or defense. If two trials are identical,
one should not be constitutionally inadequate and the other
constitutionally adequate.
Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315 n.17.
Thus, it would not matter here if defense counsel subjectively intended
to introduce the content of Teresa’s alleged threat but was unable to do so
because he did not understand the rules of evidence. As argued in the State’s
opening brief, a competent attorney still could have reasonably concluded
that he need not respond to the prosecutor’s hearsay objection by arguing
that the words were non-hearsay. By this time, the judge had already
sustained several hearsay objections and counsel could have reasonably
concluded that he was not likely to succeed in getting the words of the threat
admitted. R.291:113. And where the jury had already heard ample testimony
that Defendant believed Teresa had threatened him, he “thought the threat
was serious,” and he believed Teresa intended to harm him, defense counsel
could have reasonably concluded that getting the specific wording of Teresa’s
threat was not so necessary to the defense that it was worth pressing the issue
further. R.278:113-114, 117. Indeed, a reasonable attorney could conclude that
he already had more than enough to add the threat piece to the larger extreme
emotional disturbance puzzle—Defendant testified that he was afraid of
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Teresa because she had threatened him, he believed she had a gun, and he
believed she intended to use it.
And certainly, while the record is silent as to the precise words of
Teresa’s alleged threat, defense counsel knew what they were. Richter, 562
U.S. at 105 (“Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted
with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.”). And knowing
what the specific words of the threat were, counsel could have reasonably
concluded that introducing the precise words would not have been so
materially more helpful to Defendant’s defense that it was critical to get them
into evidence. By leaving the specific words to the jury’s imagination, counsel
could magnify the effect of Defendant’s testimony, allowing the jury to
believe that the threat was greater than what it actually may have been.
Defendant concedes as much. In his response, Defendant admits that
“the details of the threat were significantly less important than the source of
the threat.” Br.Resp.35. The State agrees. And because the jury was well
aware that Teresa was the source of the threat, by Defendant’s own account,
defense counsel did not perform deficiently. For if appellate counsel—a
competent, reasonable attorney—could come to the same conclusion as trial
counsel, Defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that “no
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competent attorney” would have acted similarly. Moore, 562 U.S. at 124. The
court of appeals erred in holding otherwise.
II.
DEFENDANT, LIKE THE COURT OF APPEALS,
MISAPPLIED
STRICKLAND’S
PERFORMANCE
STANDARD BY SPECULATING THAT THE UNKNOWN
CONTENT OF TERESA’S ALLEGED THREAT WOULD
HAVE UNDERMINED CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME
Defendant also defends the court of appeals’ prejudice analysis. He
argues that the court of appeals correctly determined that Defendant was
prejudiced because the “jury did not hear the one piece of evidence that
would have contextualized and legitimized [Defendant]’s fear that Teresa
was going to harm him” and “why Teresa’s other acts . . . would have caused
him extreme distress.” Br.Resp.43.
This argument conflicts with Defendant’s concession that knowing the
specifics of the threat was far less critical than knowing who made it.
Br.Resp.35. By Defendant’s own account, the jury had all the critical
information; therefore, the additional information would not have
sufficiently changed the evidentiary picture to make a more favorable
outcome reasonably probable.
In any event, the threat is not part of the record. And without knowing
the content of Teresa’s threat, this is only speculation. Strickland requires
more.
-21-

To prove prejudice on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The “likelihood of a different result must
be substantial, not just conceivable,” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112, such that
counsel’s error “‘actually had an adverse effect on the defense.’” Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 693). And
the defendant’s proof of prejudice “cannot be a speculative matter but must
be a demonstrable reality.” Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30 (quotations and citation
omitted). That is, he “has the difficult burden of showing . . . actual prejudice.”
State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (1993) (emphasis in original).
In assessing whether a defendant has carried his burden, appellate
courts “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. This “requires . . . a probing and fact-specific
analysis.” Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 955 (2010) (per curiam). At a minimum,
the reviewing must consider each of counsel’s alleged deficiencies in the
context of the inculpatory evidence presented at trial and demonstrate how
counsel’s alleged deficiency would have so altered the evidentiary landscape
that a more favorable outcome would be reasonably probable. Id.
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The court of appeals failed to apply this standard. And Defendant fails
to take into account that without having the content of the threat in the
record, the conclusion that Defendant was prejudiced was mere speculation.
Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30. Indeed, there was no basis to reject the possibility
that the content of the threat was just as likely to cause the jury to conclude
that Defendant’s fear was unfounded.
A. This court can—and should—reverse without addressing
defendant’s rule 23b motion.
While Defendant asserts that the record “is adequate for the purposes
of conducting a Strickland analysis,” he argues that this Court cannot reverse
without “having his 23B motion ruled on.” Br.Resp.39-40. He thus asks that
if this Court were not to affirm, it should permit him to file his rule 23B
motion in this Court or that it remand to the court of appeals so that court
may rule on his 23B motion. See Br.Resp.38-40, 44-45. This Court should do
none of the above.
It is “well settled” that this Court may affirm a judgment of a lower
court if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record.
State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ¶31, 994 P.2d 1243. This Court has thus “never”
remanded ineffective assistance of counsel claims to the court of appeals. Id.
“Remanding this purely legal question to the Court of Appeals would waste
time, money, and judicial resources.” And where remanding “would likely
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result in the case coming back again to this Court,” that “procedure would
advance no sound policy of judicial review, whether by certiorari or
otherwise.” Id.
Here, remanding the case to the court of appeals to rule on Defendant’s
rule 23B motion would “advance no sound policy of judicial review.” Id.
Even if he were granted a remand, Defendant cannot meet his burden to
prove ineffective assistance of counsel.
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, “provides a mechanism
for criminal defendants to supplement the record with facts that are
necessary for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel but which do not
appear in the record.” State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18, ¶ 17, ---P.3d---(emphasis
added). But remands are only available for entry of findings of fact, which
are “necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.”
A remand is not “necessary” to a “finding” of ineffective assistance of
counsel here, for Defendant cannot meet his burden to prove ineffective
assistance of counsel in any event. Defendant’s 23B proffer only sought a
remand to add to the record the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat. But
the jury already knew what Defendant now concedes is the critical
information—“the details of the threat were significantly less important than
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the source of the threat.” Br.Resp.35. As a result, Defendant cannot show that
all competent attorneys would have made a non-hearsay objection even
knowing the content of the alleged threat. This alone is enough to defeat his
Strickland claim—and a remand is unnecessary to make this determination.
And similarly, even with a remand, Defendant would not be able to
show prejudice. The jury had the critical information—Defendant told the
jury that Teresa had threatened him and that the threat made him fear for his
life. No matter how threatening the specifics of Teresa’s alleged threat could
be, they were unlikely to have added enough additional detail to overcome
all the other evidence undercutting the extreme emotional disturbance
theory. Richter, 562 U.S. at 111. And even the specifics would have required
the jury to believe Defendant’s uncorroborated testimony weighed against
third-party witness accounts and Defendant’s recorded 911 call coldly
reporting that he had killed his wife for reasons wholly unrelated to any
threat.
This Court should reverse.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in the State’s opening
brief, the Court should reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. The
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Court should then remand to the case to the court of appeals to resolve
Defendant’s verdict-urging instruction claim.
Respectfully submitted on February 16, 2018.
SEAN D. REYES
Utah Attorney General
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